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"ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS": Responding 
to an Ivory Tower Critique 
By Robert H. Lande· 
Professor Arthur Austin·· recently reviewed the Nutshell, Anti-
trust Law and Economics by Ernest Gellhorn. 1 Austin makes several 
valid and significant points.2 But I disagree sharply with his overall 
assessment of the book and believe that even most of his valid criti-
cisms are right for the wrong reasons. In the interest of full and 
open debate I respectfully offer a very different opinion for public 
consideration. 
I believe the Nutshell is a magnificent volume that is a great asset 
to antitrust students and practitioners. It is a particularly valuable 
guide to antitrust theory, practice, and decision making in the Rea-
gan Administration.3 As Austin concedes, the Nutshell's economic 
material is especially superb.4 This alone is worth the price of the 
book. The Nutshell would be a useful addition to any antitrust li-
brary and a superb complement to most antitrust casebooks. Anti-
trust teachers should recommend or assign it to their students (as I 
do).5 
• Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I am grateful to 
Winston S. Moore who, in 1982-84, incisively instructed me about the virtues of an 
earlier edition of this Nutshell. I also appreciate the useful ideas I received from Dennis 
R. Hornbach . 
.. Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. 
1. Austin, Book Review, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 193 (1987) (reviewing E. GELLHORN, 
ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (3rd ed. 1986» [hereinafter Austin]. 
2. Austin and I agree that the Nutshell's economic material is superb. We also 
agree that the book suffers from an inadequate number of citations to non-Chicagoist 
economic and policy sources and that the author could have devoted more attention to 
mergers. In addition, we each have a past association with Mr. Gellhorn at, respectively, 
the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. 
We both also appear to be more enforcement oriented than Gellhorn. 
3. If our next president is a Republican this volume will in all likelihood retain its 
present utility. If not, this edition may need to be revised to remain as valuable to 
students and practioners. 
4. See Austin, supra note I, at 194. The basic introductory coverage of economics is 
almost exactly what a beginning antitrust student or practitioner needs to know. The 
economic commentary throughout the rest of the volume is also a first class way to teach 
students to "think like an antitrust lawyer." Although one always could wish for more 
economics - each reader will have his or her own areas they wish Gellhorn had covered 
in more detail - it is difficult to fault this section. Gellhorn's accomplishment here 
should not be underrated; so many of today's antitrust casebooks have either too little 
economics, outdated economics, or economics that is too difficult to understand. 
Gellhorn strikes close to the perfect balance, an extraordinarily difficult task. 
5. Among its many strengths are its succinct and accurate summaries of numerous 
areas of the law. An antitrust teacher who wants to cover a marginal topic briefly often 
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Austin appears to have three major criticisms: (1) lack of attention 
to the historical, populist underpinnings of antitrust; (2) confused 
explanation of the. distinction between the rule of reason and per se 
standards; and (3) inadequate attention to mergers and tying. He 
also has a damning complaint, that the Nutshell deceptively at-
tempts to promote conservative ideology. Let me discuss these in 
order. 
Although Gellhorn presents an introductory discussion of the his-
torical underpinnings of antitrust law,6 Austin complains that Gell-
horn's subsequent case law and subject matter discussions ignore 
the populist influence in favor of strictly economic analysis. 7 While 
I do not embrace Gellhorn's particular brand of economics,s I 
would not want my students who begin practicing antitrust law in 
1988 to argue cases in populist terms. Whether the litigation in-
volves mergers, monopolization or vertical restraints, arguments to-
day should not be framed in terms of the hostility towards big 
business and the "robber barons" that Austin reminds us had so 
much influence on the passage of the antitrust laws.9 I shudder to 
think of the reception this approach would receive from the current 
federal antitrust enforcers or from most federal judges, approxi-
mately half of whom were appointed by President Reagan. lO Gell-
horn's emphasis on economics, market power, and efficiency is 
especially valuable since so many Warren Court antitrust cases, 
which students read in their casebooks, are of dubious or no validity 
even though they have never been explicitly overruled. As a result, 
most students acquire a distorted belief as to the importance of pop-
ulism in deciding current antitrust cases. A dose of Gellhorn is a 
cannot in good conscience assign students to read half a dozen cases totaling more than 
100 pages. For these situations the 10-20 page treatment in the Nutshell, consisting of 
cogent 2-3 page case summaries and analysis, is perfect. 
6. E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAw AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 1-3 (3rd ed. 1986). 
7. See Austin, supra note I, at 197. 
8. For example, Gellhom stresses economic efficiency throughout the Nutshell. I 
strongly would have preferred that he also emphasize the wealth transfer effects of 
market power - how market power can be used by firms with market power to acquire 
wealth from consumers. See generally Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982) 
(asserting that the antitrust laws were enacted primarily for the purpose of preventing 
firms with market power from 0 extracting wealth from consumers). 
9. See Austin, supra note I, at 195. 
10. The same can be said for Austin's curious belief that the common law principles 
of restraint of trade are "indispensable guides" to understanding the current antitrust 
laws. Ido at 194. I would be surprised if any astute antitrust practitioners, academics, or 
enforcers agreed with him. 
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perfect counterweight for this problem. His decision to analyze 
most cases solely in terms of economics is correct. II 
Austin also complains that Gellhorn has confused the per se/rule 
of reason distinction. He then attempts through a substantial por-
tion of his review to straighten it out. 12 This area of antitrust law is, 
however, impossibly complex. I do not believe that Austin, in his 
treatment of the subject, or anyone else, has yet untangled this area 
clearly and satisfactorily.13 Because Gellhorn recognizes the impor-
tance of this distinction and handles it well,14 it seems unfair to be-
rate the Nutshell for not clarifying the confusion, a task that neither 
Austin nor anyone else has yet accomplished. 
Given the importance of mergers in today's world, Austin might 
be right in saying that Gellhorn has given insufficient attention to 
this subject. 15 However, Austin's criticism is right for the wrong 
reasons. 16 He complains that the Nutshell gives inadequate atten-
tion to the intricacies of United States v. Von's Grocery and other such 
trivialties. 17 But any astute antitrust practitioner knows that a thor-
ough knowledge of Von's Grocery is of virtually no benefit. The case 
is so dead and misguided that it is an embarrassment even to most 
enforcement-minded members of the antitrust community. An 
overly lengthy treatment in the Nutshell would only distort stu-
dents' views as to the status of merger enforcement and case law 
today (and after the 1988 election). Antitrust will not return to the 
Von's Grocery standard in the foreseeable future and I certainly do 
not want my students to spend their time mulling its nuances. Gell-
horn's treatment of the case is fine, while Austin's prescription 
would do more harm than good. 
11. The volume would have been even better if his economics had been more 
balanced. For further discussion of the Nutshell's ideological bias, see infra notes 26-29 
and accompanying text. 
12. See Austin, supra note I, at 197-99. 
13. For perhaps the best attempt to explain this distinction, see 7 P. AREEDA, 
ANTITRUST LAw ~ 1511 (1986), cited with approval in E. GELLHORN, supra note 6 at 187. 
14. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 169-202; see also Gellhorn & Tatham, Making 
Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. 155 (1985). 
15. Austin, supra note I, at 202. 
16. Moreover, Austin's count of 49 pages (attempting to show how few pages the 
Nutshell devoted to mergers) is unfair since it omits highly relevant material in other 
sections of the book. See id. For example, Gellhorn discusses the approach to market 
definition taken by the Department of Justice in their 1984 Merger Guidelines and other 
material on market definition on pages 96 through 115. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 6, 
at 96-115. Although market definition principles are integral to merger analysis, these 
pages are not counted in Austin's merger total. 
17. See Austin, supra note I, at 202-03 (discussing United States v. Von's Grocery, 
384 U.S. 270 (1966)). 
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If I were adding merger material to the Nutshell I would instead 
add to its discussion of the Department of Justice Merger Guide-
lines,18 an especially important practitioner'S concern. Regardless 
whether Austin likes them, the Guidelines dominate current merger 
analysis and day-to-day practice. Even a future enforcement~ 
oriented administration will likely use a similar analytical approach 
to mergers. It is, therefore, crucial for students to learn the Guide-
lines well. 19 
Austin also complains that Gellhorn failed to unravel tying analy-
sis, a "mysterious phenomenon which is not wholly understood by 
anyone."20 As Austin correctly observes, this area has never been 
satisfactorily analyzed or explained. While I agree that Gellhorn has 
not advanced the field, I strongly disagree that the Nutshell is the 
appropriate forum for this kind of achievement. A law review, not a 
Nutshell, is the place for revolutionary thinking about tying analysis. 
A Nutshell should concentrate on explanation, not innovation. This 
Nutshell explains the existing situation as well as can be expected 
given that tying has never been properly analyzed.21 Again, Austin 
evaluates the Nutshell by the wrong criteria and expects it to accom-
plish what the antitrust profession has so far been unable to do. 
The above criticisms pale compared to Austin's chief complaint: 
that the Nutshell deceptively attempts to promote Chicago School 
ideology. Austin is correct only in that the Nutshell does cite 
predominantly to conservative literature. In the predatory pricing 
section, for example, I would have preferred that Gellhorn cite 
more extensively to articles and theories explaining why predatory 
pricing can harm consumer welfare,22 or why true predatory pricing 
may be more common than some believe.23 I would also have liked 
18. See E. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 367. 
19. I agree with Austin's apparent belief that the Reagan Administration has been 
too lax on mergers. One of my biggest complaints is that the Administration has not 
enforced the Guidelines as they were written. 
20. Austin, supra note I, at 199 (quoting G. HALE & R. HALE, MARKET POWER: SIZE 
AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 53 (1958). 
21. The author is working on his own attempt to analyze tying correctly. See Lande, 
Untangling Tying, (1988 draft) (unpublished manuscript). 
22. For excellent analysis and more extensive citations, see Ordover & Wall, Proving 
Predation after Monfort and Matsushita: What the "New Learning" Has to Offer, in I ANTITRUST 
No.3, at 5 (1987) and Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging 
Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1982). 
23. For example, I believe Koller's empirical "proof" that predatory pricing is so 
rare that it does not merit antitrust attention has effectively been rebutted by one of the 
best antitrust articles ever published, Zerbe & Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical 
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655 (1982). Since the Nutshell 
cited Koller, I fervently wish it had cited Zerbe & Cooper as well. See E. GELLHORN, supra 
note 6, at 92 n.l. 
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to see more references to the important new "raising rivals' costs" 
literature.24 Even if Gellhorn is right and Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act should be repealed the Nutshell should be written for today's 
reality, as an aid to plaintiffs as well as defendants. This is especially 
true if its purpose is to survive the current conservative antitrust era. 
However, because the predation sources Gellhorn cites are more 
balanced than those recently cited by the Supreme Court in Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,25 one must be 
careful in accusing the Nutshell's economics of being out of touch 
with today's antitrust center. 
More importantly, even on the issue of the Nutshell's lack of ideo-
logical balance Austin is right for the wrong reasons. Austin's sharp-
est criticism is not that the Nutshell lacks ideological balance, but 
that it deceptively attempts to portray itself as neutral while actually 
pushing a conservative agenda. Austin writes: "Without a declara-
tion or warning, Gellhorn evangelizes the gospel of the Chicago 
School. "26 Austin accuses Gellhorn of selling the Chicago School 
approach through "subtle but nevertheless effective" methods that 
"subliminally condition the user to accept their system of economics 
and antitrust as the final authority."27 
Nonsense. There is nothing subtle, subliminal, or disguised 
about the Nutshell's ideology. The first sentence of its preface un-
critically quotes Justice Holmes' belief that the Sherman Act is 
"humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence."28 The 
first paragraph of its chapter on Monopoly opines: "[T]he growth 
of monopoly power except for desirable reasons (such as economies 
of scale limiting the number of firms) remains without theoretical 
24. The only reference I can find in the Nutshell to this path-breaking literature is E. 
GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 246. For a more thorough discussion and citations to the 
literature, see Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to 
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986). 
25. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Compare E. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 144-46 (citing in 
order: Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 
YALE L.]. 284 (1977); F. FISHER,]. MCGOWAN &]. GREENWOOD, FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND 
MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND U.S. v. IBM (1983); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies 
and Counterstrategies. 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981» with Zenith, 475 U.S. at 589 (citing in 
order: R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); Koller, The Myth of 
Predatory Pricing-An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); McGee, 
Predatory Pricing Revisted, 23]. L. & ECON. 289 (1980». 
26. Austin, supra note I, at 204. 
27. [d. (footnote omitted). 
28. E. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at XVII. 
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support."29 Gellhorn makes no attempt to hide his ideology - it is 
bold and unashamed. Antitrust students should have little trouble 
recognizing Gellhorn's brand of antitrust, and I would expect any 
teacher assigning or recommending the Nutshell to call it to stu-
dents' attention. Gellhorn says, in effect, "Here is one side of the 
argument - the one that currently is winning - and since you know 
my slant you can discount it if you wish." This is not as valuable as a 
more evenhanded presentation, but it is unfair and incorrect to ac-
cuse the Nutshell of deception. 
My suggestions as to how the Nutshell could have been even bet-
ter should not detract from my overall strongly held conclusions. 
The Nutshell fairly must be considered a masterful source of wis-
dom, especially in explaining antitrust economics and the antitrust 
analysis currently taking place in Washington, D.C. and the vast ma-
jority of recent antitrust decisions. It provides a valuable perspec-
tive and superb training in thinking like an antitrust lawyer and 
understanding complex areas of antitrust law. Its other chief virtues 
are its clarity of exposition and comprehensiveness. It is a valuable 
resource for any law student or practitioner, and I strongly en-
courage its use. 
29. !d. at 91. 
